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Alice Ristroph*

COVENANTS FOR THE SWORD'

How, and how much, can constitutional law restrain state violence? Though
American constitutional law purports to regulate policing and punishment in
various ways, as a practicalmatter these uses of force are restrainedlittle by constitutional doctrine. This article examines explanations for that phenomenon. As
Thomas Hobbes observed, it is difficult if not impossible to establish a truly independent authority to interpret and enforce legal restrictions on sovereign power.
Furthermore, in order for law to restrain the state, we need a conception of the
state; we need to know what entity is the subject of constitutional law. We lack
clear answers to that question, and as a consequence, putative legal restraints on
state violence remain largely ineffective.
Keywords: violence/constitutional law/criminal procedure/policing/
punishment

Constitutional democracies use violence widely and regularly. They use it
in military conflicts, in counter-terrorism efforts, and, of particular interest in this article, they use it in daily exercises of policing and punishment. But citizens of constitutional democracies tend not to think of
their governments as particularly violent. If they notice the violence of
the criminal justice system, they see it as distinctively legitimate and
perhaps not violence at all properly so called, though similar acts
would be labelled violent if conducted by private citizens. Police and
punitive force are understood to be distinctive acts of public authority,
rendered normatively legitimate by the political and legal context in
which they take place.
In the United States, that legal context includes constitutional provisions understood to provide some outer limits on the permissible use
of physical force. The Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
seizures is understood to regulate arrests and other uses of force by
police officers, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments is understood to restrict both the legislative
power to authorize criminal sentences and the executive power to
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administer them.' To be sure, these constitutional provisions are hardly
the only means by which state violence might be regulated. For most
ordinary policing and punishment practices, legislative or executive regulation (including executive self-regulation) has more practical impact
than judicial scrutiny of decisions to use force. 2 By most accounts, the
Constitution provides only a kind of backstop, used to address egregious
uses of force that non-constitutional regulations have wrongly authorized
or failed to prevent. But even if the Constitution is only a backstop - and
one placed at great distance from the action in the batter's box - its symbolic import looms over the game. Again, the physical force used to
police and punish is widely viewed as legitimate, and the Constitution is
3
one important source of that legitimacy.
To notice that liberal democracies do use violence to govern (and also
to think of that violence as subject to constitutional constraints) is to
provoke a number of questions about criminal and constitutional law
that might fairly be described as Hobbesian. Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century English philosopher best known for his bare-knuckled
defence of a powerful sovereign legitimated by a social contract, gave
special attention to violence as a source of - and partial solution to human misery. The fact that we can hardly imagine a state without
1 Us Const amend IV; US Const amend VIII. Other constitutional provisions also seem to
embody anti-violence norms. The 'due process' clause has been interpreted to prohibit
torture and other uses of force that 'shock the conscience'; see Rochin v California, 342
US 165 (1952) [Rochin]. The Fifth- Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination is also widely understood as an anti-torture provision, though this view
does not appear to command a majority of the present Supreme Court. Compare
Chavez v Martinez, 538 US 760 at 773 (2003) (Thomas J), arguing that the 'due
process' clause rather than the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination
governs an inquiry into alleged police torture, with Rochin, ibid at 794 (Kennedy J,
concurring in part and dissenting in part): 'To tell our whole legal system that when
conducting a criminal investigation police officials can use severe compulsion or
even torture with no present violation of the right against compelled selfincrimination can only diminish a celebrated provision in the Bill of Rights.'
2 Although the degree of 'police professionalization' is probably sometimes exaggerated
to argue against the need for constitutional regulation, see e.g., Hudson v Michigan, 547
US 586 at 598-9 (2006) [Hudson], it is clear that internal self-regulation does play an
important role in shaping police conduct. For a response to Hudson and a more
nuanced account of non-constitutional sources of police accountability, see David
Alan Sklansky, 'Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?' (2008) 5:2 Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law 567.
3 The relationship between the Constitution and the perceived legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is complex. In the eyes of many observers, applications of the rules of
constitutional criminal procedure are bothersome 'technicalities' that impede the
(independently legitimate) efforts of the state to investigate and punish wrongdoers.
Nevertheless, the background fact of constitutional regulation appears to provide a
kind of underwriting of the system. C.f Alice Ristroph, 'The Rhetoric of Difference
and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment' (2001) 114 Harv L Rev 1599.
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police or prisons calls to mind Hobbes's particular emphasis on enforcement: 'Covenants, without the sword, are but words. ' 4 One might say the
same of law more generally and the criminal law in particular.
Notwithstanding the powerful critiques of sanction-based theories of
law advanced by HLA Hart and others, there are many instances in
which law appears to require the sword in order to be more than rhetorical exhortation.' But if the violence of policing and punishment suggests
that Hobbes was right about the need for the sword, we might wonder
how covenants for the sword - the constitutional provisions that restrain
the punishing state - will themselves be enforced.6
In an argument widely rejected by modem theorists of constitutional government, Hobbes claimed that the only effective sovereign would be one with
absolute, undivided authority.7 Since this single, powerful sovereign would

possess ultimate legislative, judicial, and executive authority, no one else
could reach a binding judgment that the sovereign had acted illegally or
enforce sanctions against it. We tend to assume that we have long ago left
behind Hobbes and his crude theory of the absolute sovereign. In a twentyfirst century system of divided government, it seems clear that we have solutions to the problems of interpretation and enforcement. To the question
of who will interpret the laws that bind the sovereign, we answer: an independentjudiciary. To the question of howjudgments against the sovereign will be
enforced, we have an array of answers: monetary damages, injunctions, invalidation of legislation, and exclusion of evidence. It seems we have the necessary
institutional mechanisms to interpret and enforce covenants for the sword.
Without denying the tangible effects of judicial review and constitutional remedies, I argue that in the United States these institutions do
surprisingly little to restrain exercises of force by the state against its own
citizens. In part, this is because the problems of interpretation and enforcement are not so easy to solve, as Hobbes might have warned us. But the
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed by Richard Tuck (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991) at 117 [Hobbes]. Throughout this article, I have modernized the.
spelling, punctuation, and capitalization of quotations from Leviathan.
5 See John Austin, The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined (London: Widenfield and
Nicholson, 1954); HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
For a recent reappraisal of the debate, see Frederick Schauer, 'Was Austin Right
After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law' (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 1.
6 As metaphors go, the sword is a mighty one. For Hobbes, 'the sword' is the enforcer,
the sovereign empowered to use violence. In speaking of covenants for the sword, I
am invoking a similar idea - the sword is the entity with the monopoly on
legitimate violence, and the question is how restrictions on the sword itself will be
enforced. In an important article that addresses some similar issues, Walter Dellinger
deployed the same word to different figurative ends, to describe the Constitution as
the source of affirmative causes of action; see Walter E Dellinger, 'Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword' (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1532.
7 See Part II-B below.
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inefficacy of covenants for the sword is also a manifestation of a different
problem, one that Hobbes did not identify and may, in fact, have helped
produce. In order for law to regulate the state or the government, it
must assume some conception of that entity. What, exactly, is 'the state'
that is the subject of constitutional law? We don't have good answers to
this question, I argue. Constitutional doctrine rarely addresses it directly.8
But a study of the constitutional law of violence yields some clues.
In many respects, constitutional law assumes an anthropomorphic
conception of its own legal subject. In the simplest terms, the anthropomorphism of interest here is the idea that we should analogize the government to a human individual.9 On this view, the government reasons,
intends, acts, speaks, and responds to stimuli in ways comparable to the
behaviour of natural human persons. Carol Steiker once described constitutional criminal procedure as 'substantive criminal law for cops."
Steiker's image is a richly productive one for several reasons explored
in this article. For the moment, substitute 'the state' or 'the sovereign'
for 'cops' and we may identify one consequence of anthropomorphizing
the state: doctrines of constitutional law structured as substantive criminal
law for the state. Substantive criminal law regulates individuals by imposing sanctions on defined offences, and the defendant's mental state is
often a key component of the offence definition. Both Fourth and
Eighth Amendment doctrines define constitutional violations in terms
of what might be called sovereign mens rea standards, and in both
8 I am not making a point about state-action doctrine, although that doctrine may well
still be a 'conceptual disaster area'; Charles L Black,Jr, 'Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14' (1967) 81 Harv L Rev 69 at 95. State-action
doctrine addresses the extent to which the Constitution constrains apparently private
actors or 'the constitutional implications of distribution of the background rights of
contract, property, and tort'; Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, 'State Action Doctrine
and a New Birth of Freedom' (2004) 92 Geo LJ 779 at 779. The state-action
doctrine, muddled as it may be, is about the public/private distinction; it is about
the periphery of the state. I argue here that we lack a theory of the cow, that even with
respect to action that we unquestioningly categorize as state action, we lack a good
account of the state that is doing the acting.
9 Hobbes, supra note 4, offers us a memorable image of the sovereign as a person: The
frontispiece to Leviathan depicts a long-haired, moustachioed man, sword and crosier
in his widespread arms, jewelled crown atop his head. Upon close scrutiny, it becomes
evident that the man's torso and arms are composed of tiny individual humans,
crowded closely together and gazing toward the head of the composite Leviathan.
But one need not (and should not) think of the anthropomorphic view of the
sovereign as exclusively Hobbesian. From Plato's image of the city as a well-ordered
soul to Louis XIV's 'l'Etat, c'est mo' and on to contemporary invocations of the state's
right to 'self-defence,' the human individual has long provided a basis to
conceptualize both the state as a whole and its rulers.
10 Carol Steiker, 'Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers' (1996) 94 Mich L Rev 2466 at 2470.
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doctrinal contexts constitutional remedies tend to be viewed in terms of
sanctioning the sovereign." This doctrinal structure leaves the constitutional restraints fairly weak, for two primary reasons. First, sovereign
mens rea is elusive; what the state 'intended' can often be constructed
or reconstructed after the fact to avoid a finding of a constitutional violation. In addition, when constitutional remedies are understood in terms
of sanctions against the sovereign to deter future violations, courts can and often do - decline to impose any remedy at all when there is reason
to believe the remedy will not have a deterrent effect.'2
A somewhat more complicated set of challenges arises from the fact
that, if there is a sovereign in a modem state, it is not just any person a natural man crowned as king - but what Hobbes calls 'an artificial
person."' An artificial person is an authorized representative, an agent
who acts on behalf of a principal.' 4 On one simple account of representative government, one might characterize 'the public' or 'the people'
as the principal and the government as their authorized agent. The government, as artificial person, is something of an abstraction. But most
kinds of government action, and certainly the exercises of force under
scrutiny here, require flesh-and-blood natural persons to carry them
out. So a second set of principal-agent relationships must come into
being: the government, now as principal, authorizes individual government officers to exercise force on its behalf.
In both types of principal-agent relationship, it is possible that the
agent will act outside the scope of his proper authority or otherwise fail
to serve the interests of the principal.'5 In the terminology of agency
11 The notion of sovereign mens ra is more counter-intuitive for Fourth Amendment
doctrine than for Eighth, but I argue it is applicable in both areas. See Part III below.
12 Of course, with respect to criminal sanctions of natural persons, deterrence is only one
of many possible rationales. But the other rationales often cited as justifications for
punishment of individuals, such as retribution or rehabilitation, seem inapplicable to
the state; at any rate, sanctions for the sovereign are nearly always explained as
efforts to deter future violations. For further discussion, see Part III below.
13 One very early interpretation of the US Constitution expressed doubt that it established
any kind of 'sovereign' at all; see Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US 419 at 454 (1793): 'To the
Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is totally unknown.' This claim
in Chisholm was arguably repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment. See Randy
Barnett, 'The People or the State? Chisholm v Georgia and Popular Sovereignty'
(2007) 93 Va L Rev 1729, describing and arguing against the claim that the Eleventh
Amendment repudiated the view of sovereignty announced in Chisholm.
14 This is Hobbes's account, but as with the anthropomorphic view of the sovereign, for
the purposes of this article, it matters little whether it is distinctively Hobbesian. As I
show below, the principal-agent account of sovereignty and of the relationship
between the government and individual government officers has deeply influenced
American constitutional law.
15 Aware of this problem, Hobbes argued that monarchy was the best form of government
because in it the interests of the sovereign and his constituents were most closely
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6
scholarship., there may be 'slippage' between principal and agent.' When
an individual state officer exercises force on behalf of the state, courts do
not always assume that the act of the government officer - the natural
person - is also an act of the sovereign. In Hobbesian terms, the constitutional law of violence contemplates possible distinctions between the
artificial person of the sovereign and the natural person who most
immediately exercises violence on behalf of the sovereign. This distinction between artificial and natural persons helps illuminate some features
of constitutional remedies. But that distinction also renders remedies
unavailable in many circumstances, leaving us to wonder again whether
constitutional provisions regulating the use of force are but words.
Hobbes's own assessment of covenants for the sword was that such
restrictions were both infeasible and undesirable. Without endorsing
either the descriptive or normative claim, modem constitutionalists
might nevertheless find that the Hobbesian account illuminates the difficulties American constitutional law has encountered in its attempts to
regulate state violence. Hobbes gives us a new perspective on the
already familiar problems of legal uncertainty and enforcement, and
his theory brings attention to the less familiar problem of articulating
the subject of constitutional law.17 The constitutional law of state violence
(and perhaps, much of the rest of constitutional law) lacks a clear and
accurate account of the entity it purports to regulate.
Motivated by the premise that to regulate the state or sovereign, we
should know what we are regulating, Part II of the present article examines Hobbes's account of sovereignty as personation. I do not suggest that
constitutional law has directly adopted these Hobbesian concepts - far
from it. But as will become clear, the notion of a personified sovereign
and the related principal-agent theory of authorization and representation provide many insights into contemporary constitutional doctrine.
Part III addresses one form of anthropomorphism in American constitutional doctrine: 'sovereign mens rea' standards that create a kind of

aligned. Hobbes, supra note 4 at 131: '[W] here the public and private interest are most
closely united, there is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy, the private interest
is the same with the public.'
16 See e.g. Elena Kagan, 'Presidential Administration' (2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2245 at
2273, describing 'a typical principal-agent dilemma: how to ensure against slippage
between the behavior the principal desires from the agent and the behavior the
principal actually receives, given the agent's own norms, interests, and informational
advantages.'
17 While this article was under review and in the publication process, Nicholas
Rosenkranz published two articles that engage many similar questions. Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, 'The Objects of the Constitution' (2011) 63 Stan L Rev 1005;
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 'The Subjects of the Constitution' (2010) 62 Stan L
Rev 1209. I am unable to incorporate a discussion of these articles here, but I
expect to address Rosenkranz's argument in subsequent work.
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substantive criminal law for the state. Part IV investigates constitutional
remedies to illuminate more complex claims about the relationship
between natural persons and the artificial person of the state. The
Conclusion suggests that, at the moment, a Hobbesian account of an
extra-legal sovereign prerogative to use violence remains more true
than modern constitutionalists might like to acknowledge. By identifying
and acknowledging the challenges facing the constitutional regulation of
violence, we put ourselves in a better position to overcome them.
u Personation,authorization, and sovereignty
Thomas Hobbes is not often consulted for insights into modem constitutional theory. There seems *a clear conflict between the modem view
of constitutional government as limited government, on the one hand,
and Hobbes's claim that the social contract is an agreement among citizens that imposes no obligations or restraints on the sovereign, on the
other. Indeed, the sociological legitimacy of a constitutional democracy that is, the fact that its citizens accept and endorse the government - rests
in no small part on the perception that government power is meaningfully limited by constitutional text and principle. The absolutist strains
of Hobbes's political theory seem antithetical to now unquestioned
principles of limited government.
And yet Hobbes's political theory proves a surprisingly rich resource
for studies of the constitutional regulation of state violence. As noted in
the introduction, Hobbes was unusually concerned with the role of violence in human affairs. Perhaps this attention to violence made
Hobbes somewhat less sanguine about the promise of limited government than was his intellectual successor, John Locke, who is far more
likely to appear in studies of constitutional theory. 8 But the apparent
intractability of violence both private and public even in today's world
suggests that we should not overlook what Hobbes had to teach.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, Hobbes's endorsement of absolutism is often overstated; he is, in fact, the originator of many of the concepts that underlie theories of liberal constitutionalism.' 9 In Hobbes, we
18 For a recent example of Lockean constitutional scholarship, see David Jenkins, 'The
Lockean Constitution: Separation of Powers and the Limits of Prerogative' (2011) 56
McGill LJ 543.
19 Alice Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory' (2009).97 Cal L Rev
601 at 605-13 [Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance']; see also David Dyzenhaus,
'Hobbes's Constitutional Theory' in Ian Shapiro, ed, Leviathan: Or The Matter, Forme
& Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2010) 453 [Dyzenhaus, 'Constitutional Theory']; David Dyzenhaus, 'How
Hobbes Met the "Hobbes Challenge"' (2009) 72 Mod L Rev 488 [Dy zenhaus,
'Hobbes Challenge'].
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can see the source of some* of our most basic liberal ideas, and we may
develop a renewed appreciation of the difficulties of translating those
ideas into stable yet limited political institutions.

A THE SOVEREIGN AS PERSON, OR AUTHORIZED AGENT

To understand the sovereign, it is useful to identify first the occasions for
its existence; that is, the problems that the sovereign is supposed to solve.
Briefly, Hobbes claims that human relationships in the absence of governmental authority are plagued by a dangerous plurality of wills, judgments,
and interests.2 0 More specifically, each individual reasonably pursues her
own self-preservation and, in so doing, poses threats to other individuals
also seeking to preserve themselves. Every person is at least a potential
threat to everyone else, and individuals'understandably use violence to
defend their own interests at the expense of others. According to
Hobbes, rational individuals eventually realize that to secure peace they
must renounce their individual discretion over the use of violence and
2l
instead empower a sovereign to decide how best to preserve them all.
This sovereign may well be a single human - Hobbes repeatedly
emphasizes the virtues of monarchy - but whether one ruler or a more
complex assembly, the sovereign is best understood as an artificial
person. An artificial person is not the same thing as an artificial man;
Hobbes has a precise and nuanced account of personhood.2 2 That
account merits close scrutiny, for it will prove to illuminate conceptions
of state actors and authorized agents central to constitutional law.
What, then, is a person? Hobbes offers this definition:
A person, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as
representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to
whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered
as his own, then he is called a natural person: And when they are considered as
20 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 86-90. For a slightly more detailed discussion of Hobbes's state
of nature and the way out of it, see Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance,' ibid at 607-11.
The five (or six) most famous words in Leviathan are probably 'solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short,' ibid at 89, and this phrase is often invoked to show that Hobbes
considered humans to be evil or at least dangerous and violent beings. But 'nasty'
and 'brutish' describe the 'human condition not humans themselves, and these
adjectives apply to the human condition only in the absence of civil government; see
Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance,' ibid at 607-8.
21 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 120-1.
22 In Leviathan, Hobbes, ibid, sometimes refers to the commonwealth as an artificial man,
but the sovereign is described as an artificial person. Part One of Leviathan is called 'Of
Man' and sets forth Hobbes's account of human psychology, but only the last chapter of
that part takes up the specific subject, 'Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated';
see ibid at 111.
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representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial
person.2"

Two claims here must be emphasized. First, a person is a-being capable of
speech and action. Second, a person speaks and acts on behalf of some
conceptually distinct being: the man behind the person (if the words
and actions are 'his own'), or some other man, or some other possibly
non-human entity. A man who speaks for himself is called a natural
person; one who speaks for some other man or being is a 'feigned or artificial person.'2 4 Hobbes refers to theatrical language and the Latin persona
to emphasize the distinction between the person - the representative or
signifier - and the man or other entity who is represented or signified. A
persona is a 'disguise or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on
the stage.' 2 5 A person-as-persona is an actor, 'and to personate, is to act,
or represent himself, or another; and he that acts [as] another, is said
6
to bear his person, or act in his name.'2
Hobbesian personhood links the concept of representation to the
concept of authority. 'Of persons artificial, some have their words and
actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is
the actor; and he that owns his words and actions is the author: in
which case the actor acts by authority.' 27 To authorize is to allow oneself
to be represented, or impersonated, by some separate actor. And this,
according to Hobbes, is precisely what individuals do when they contract
among themselves to create a sovereign. They. 'appoint one man, or
assembly of men, to bear their person,' and each individual is 'to own,
and acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever he that bear
their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which
concern the common peace and safety.' 28 More specifically, a multitude
of disparate individuals with potentially adverse interests reconstitutes
itself into 'a real unity of them all, in one and the same person. ' -

23 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 111.
24 Ibid; see also Quentin Skinner, 'Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State'
(1999) 7 Journal of Political Philosophy 1, appeals to strict grammatical construction
as well as the revisions that Hobbes made for the Latin Leviathan to argue that an
artificial person is an entity who is represented by another; that is, Skinner claims that
the 'artificial person' is the signified rather than the signifier. Skinner's account
raises important questions concerning the distinction and relation between state and
sovereign. But other passages from Hobbes, discussed below, seem to contradict
Skinner's suggestion that the artificial person is the represented not the
representative. See e.g. text accompanying note 27 infra.
25 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 112.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid at 120.
29 Ibid.
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Hobbes imagines the precise content of the covenant thus: '[It is] as if
every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou
give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.'30
B THE (PERSONIFIED)

SOVEREIGN AS LEGAL SUBJECT

So far, we have seen that the sovereign 'bears the person' of the commonwealth and is the authorized agent of each individual subject. But what,
precisely, is the scope of the sovereign authority? What does it mean to
give up 'the right of governing oneself'? Or to rephrase the more
narrow concern of this article: can subjects qualify their authorization
of the sovereign in ways that restrict its power to use violence? could
the social contract both empower and restrain the public sword?
Hobbes would answer these last two questions in the negative, for
several reasons. First, the origin of the sovereign makes it logically impossible that he (or it) would be bound by covenant to his subjects. The sovereign is not a party to the social contract and could not be such a party,
since he does not exist qua sovereign until the moment the contract is
made. Instead, the sovereign is a kind of third-party beneficiary to a contract that is made among private individuals. 'Because the right of
bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by
covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them;3 there
can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign.' '
A second reason to doubt that the sovereign could be restricted by
covenant draws upon a standard interpretation of Hobbes; namely, that
the sovereign's authority is unlimited, or else he (or it) is not properly
called a sovereign. There is considerable textual support for this
reading: for example, Hobbes says that the sovereign power 'is as great,
as possibly men can be imagined to make it' and adds that 'though of
so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the
consequences of the want of it ...are much worse.'3 2 Hobbes rejects
mixed government as unstable ('a kingdom divided in itself cannot
stand') and insists that a single, undivided sovereign must have ultimate
authority to make, interpret, and enforce the laws of the commonwealth.33 Some of these tasks may be delegated to subordinates, but
30 Ibid [italics in original].
31 Ibid at 122. Even if the office of the sovereign is occupied by a single natural person, we
should not think that this natural person covenants with the subjects. He cannot
contract with all subjects as a single party because 'as yet they are not one Person'
before the sovereign has been appointed, and if the natural-person-who-will-becomesovereign contracts with each future subject individually, those contracts will be void
once sovereignty is established; ibid at 122.
32 Ibid at 144-5.
33 Ibid at 124-7.

COVENANTS FOR THE SWORD

667

Hobbes makes clear that the subordinates are subordinates, not independent agents with the authority to check the sovereign power. And
Hobbes is explicit that the sovereign is not himself bound by the laws
he makes: 'Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself;
because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound
34
to himself only, is not bound.'
Even if it were desirable to limit sovereign power, that project would
face practical difficulties. Drawing on the arguments of legal positivists
(arguments often and with reason traced to Hobbes), we could identify
two obstacles to covenants for the sword, positive laws that restrict the
sovereign himself. First is a challenge of legal uncertainty: there is no
entity or institution empowered to determine the meaning and application of the covenants that restrict the sovereign. Hobbes rejects any
'separation of powers' theory that might assign ultimate authority over
the meaning of covenants to an institution that is separate from the institution charged with enforcing the law. So who, other than the sovereign
himself, could say with authority that the sovereign had violated the covenant?- And second, covenants for the sword would face a problem of
enforcement.3 6 Who, other than the sovereign himself, would sanction
a sovereign who violated the covenant?
This apparent absolutism is doubtless one of the reasons that Hobbes
is not often consulted by modem constitutional theorists. But the account
of unlimited sovereignty sketched above is a bit too crude. Read closely,
Hobbes in fact gives a more nuanced description of sovereign power.
Perhaps most importantly for legal theorists, Hobbes distinguishes
between power and law. Though a sovereign may sometimes act 'by
virtue of his power' without establishing a prior law, Leviathan suggests
repeatedly that the preferable form of rule is the promulgation of
written laws. 7 Like modem constitutionalists and champions of the rule
34 Ibid at 184.
35 See ibid at 123: 'Besides, if any [subject] pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the
Sovereign .... and others [or the sovereign himself] pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversy: it returns therefore to the
Sword again; and every man recovers the right of Protecting himself by his own
strength, contrary to the design they had in the Institution.'
36 For a discussion of similar issues, see Jack Goldsmith & Daryl J Levinson, 'Law for
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law' (2009) 122 Harv L Rev
1791. Goldsmith & Levinson also discuss the problems of uncertainty and
enforcement, along with a third obstacle they call 'the problem of sovereignty' - the
view, which they attribute to Hobbes, that any true sovereign must be an absolute one.
37 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 152-3, distinguishing between sovereign acts 'grounded on a
precedent law' and those 'demand[ed] or take[n] by pretense of his power.' On
Hobbes's preference for written laws, see Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance,' supra
note 19 611-2; see also Dyzenhaus, 'Constitutional Theory,' supra note 19;
Dyzenhaus, 'Hobbes Challenge,' supra note 19.
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of law, Hobbes emphasizes consistency and predictability as virtues of a
stable legal system. Moreover, even if the sovereign is not subject to civil
law, he or it is bound by the laws of nature.- To be sure, the laws of
nature are potentially undermined by the problems of uncertainty (or
contested interpretive authority) and enforcement. Subjects of the sovereign have no means to enforce the sovereign's obligations to honour the
laws of nature, and for that reason some have questioned the status of
these laws as true law.39 But Hobbes himself views these laws as real
laws, binding on the sovereign, even if it is only God that can address
the sovereign's violations.
Hobbes's sovereign may also face practical and moral constraints, if not
legal ones, by virtue of the subjects' right to resist uses of force against
them. As I have explored elsewhere, Hobbes's apparent absolutism is
severely undermined by his crystal clear insistence that subjects, even
guilty and duly convicted subjects, have a right to resist punishment."
The 'right' to resist punishment is a peculiarly Hobbesian right, one
that imposes no duties on the sovereign and does not disrupt the sovereign's authority to punish. Yet Hobbes's insistence on this right, peculiar
as it may be, demonstrates commitments to individual liberty and equality
far more robust than those offered by many later liberal theories of
punishment.
Nevertheless, even with this more nuanced account of the scope of
sovereign power, one may doubt whether Hobbes's theory can shed
much light on contemporary constitutional law. Even the less absolutist
Hobbesian sovereign does not exist in modern constitutional democracies."l Most obviously, constitutional governments do not unify legislative,
38 Hobbes, supra note 4 at 224: 'It is true, that Sovereigns are all subject to the Laws of
Nature; because such laws be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Commonwealth be
abrogated.'
39 E.g. John Deigh, 'Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan' (1996) 34Journal of the
History of Philosophy 35.
40 Ristroph, 'Respect and Resistance,' supra note 19.
41 Indeed, a sovereign that actually satisfies all the criteria identified in Leviathan,
especially the requirement of consent, has probably never existed anywhere. On my
reading, Hobbes is not a theorist of hypothetical consent. That is, he does not
permit a sovereign's authority to be based on a judgment (by whom?) that subjects
would have authorized the sovereign had they been fully rational. Indeed, I see
Hobbes's emphasis on actual consent as one reason his theory is more compelling
than later liberal accounts that explicitly base political authority on hypothesized
consent. As a deep egalitarian and individualist, Hobbes thought it normatively
important whether individuals actually consented - not whether the sovereign or his
apologists could plausibly assert that subjects should have consented if they'd only
understood their interests properly. One could develop these points into a more
radical critique of American constitutional government, arguing that the US
Constitution is not a valid contract or covenant and the government it establishes is
illegitimate. C.f Randy Barnett, 'Constitutional Legitimacy' (2003) 103 Colum L Rev
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executive, and judicial power in a single person or assembly. Instead of a
true Hobbesian sovereign, in modern constitutional democracies we find
multiple quasi-sovereigns: distinct institutions among which power is
shifted and shared. And this arrangement has not led to the dire consequences that Hobbes predicted. I think it is safe to say that, as an empirical matter, Hobbes has been proven wrong insofar as he claimed that
political stability requires a single unified ruler with combined legislative,
executive, and judicial authority.
The fact of divided sovereignty seems to address the problem of legal
uncertainty identified above, and maybe also the problem of enforcement: an independent judiciary might be endowed with the final authority to interpret the covenants that bind the sovereign, as American
courts are empowered to interpret the United States Constitution. Even
though courts lack swords to enforce their findings of unconstitutionality,
perhaps constitutional culture has rendered those more rigorous forms
of enforcement unnecessary. So long as the executive and legislative
branches do in fact respect the judgments of courts with respect to the
Constitution, there is a sense in which the Constitution should function
as a covenant for the sword.
But to what degree has a system of divided government, with separate
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, actually solved the problems of
uncertainty and enforcement? Notice, first, that constitutional theory
remains embroiled in arguments about the legitimacy of judicial review,
or more precisely, the legitimacy of judicial supremacy on questions of
constitutional interpretation, and about the 'under-enforcement' of constitutional norms. 42 And notice that, as an empirical matter, we rarely see
judicial findings that the legislative or executive branch has exceeded its
power to use physical force. In the next two parts of this article, I examine
why, even in a system of divided sovereignty, covenants restricting the
sword may turn out to be little more than words. Even if we do not
find - and do not expect to find - a Hobbesian sovereign in a
111, distinguishing the US Constitution from a valid contract but developing an
alternative theory of constitutional legitimacy. For the purposes of the present
article, I leave aside those arguments and focus on the narrower question whether
the Constitution can effectively limit state violence.
42 The literature on these topics is too vast to canvas here. For a few recent discussions, see
Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Keith E Whittington, PoliticalFoundations
of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in
US History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jeremy Waldron, 'The
Core of the Case against Judicial Review' (2006) 115 6 Yale LJ 1346. For a recent
debate on questions of constitutional under-enforcement, see Richard H Fallon, Jr,
'Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning' (2006) 119 Harv L
Rev 1274 [Fallon, 'Manageable Standards'] and responses to that piece in the
Harvard Law Review Forum.
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contemporary constitutional government, Hobbes's account of political
authority and 'personation' gives us conceptual resources to understand
and evaluate constitutional restrictions on state violence.
iii Constitutionalanthropomorphism
Laws, it seems, should know their subjects: a law that purports to regulate
the state should have an account of what the state is. In the previous part,
I reviewed a Hobbesian account of the sovereign as an artificial person. In
this part and the next, I examine the conceptions .ofthe state or sovereign
that inform Fourth and Eighth Amendment doctrine. The constitutional
law of state violence, it turns out, is premised on an anthropomorphic
account of the state in several respects. In structure, the law of public violence bears significant parallels to the law of private violence (and other
private misconduct) - the substantive criminal law. Recall Carol Steiker's
description of constitutional criminal procedure as 'substantive criminal
law for cops. ' 43 This part examines doctrinal standards that incorporate

inquiries into sovereign mens rea, the 'mental state' of the government
or its representative agent. Part IV examines the conception of remedies
for constitutional violations as penalties levied against the government.
A SOVEREIGN mens rea

i The fourth amendment
Under standard principles of substantive criminal law, the legality of
conduct often turns on the mental state of the actor. Whether firing a
lethal gunshot is murder, manslaughter, or justified self-defence can
depend on the knowledge, beliefs, and intentions of the person who
fires the gun. Something similar is afoot in Fourth Amendment doctrine,
where 'objective reasonableness' makes the difference between constitutional and unconstitutional seizures. This claim may surprise those familiar with Fourth Amendment doctrine, for the very phrase 'objective
reasonableness' may seem to foreclose inquiries into subjective mental
states." And indeed, the Supreme Court has held in many contexts that
a police officer's subjective intent will not itself make the difference
43 See text accompanying note 10 supra. There is a much more literal source of
substantive criminal law for government agents: 18 USC § 242, which makes it a
crime to intentionally deprive a person of his constitutional rights. Since this statute
does not itself define the scope of constitutional rights, I do not discuss it in detail
in this article.
44 Indeed, in an earlier article, I emphasized the distinction between Fourth and Eighth
Amendment doctrines on the question of state intentions. See Alice Ristroph, 'State
Intentions and the Law of Punishment' (2008) 98 J Crim L & Criminology 1353 at
1389-91 [Ristroph, 'State Intentions']. As will become clearer below, a kind of
mental state inquiry characterizes even Fourth Amendment doctrine; but whose
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between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct.4 To show that

objective reasonableness is analogous to a mens rea standard takes some
explanation.
That the Fourth Amendment governs seizures of the person, and that
it does so under the rubric of reasonableness may appear evident from
the constitutional text itself - its prohibition of 'unreasonable searches
and seizures. ' 46 This constitutional text is the primary source of constitutional regulation of official uses of force that take place prior to a
criminal conviction. 47 But the reasonableness standard for Fourth
Amendment seizures depends not only on the rationale for and timing
of the initial intrusion but also on the manner in which the seizure is
carried out.48 Thus, 'notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect,

an officer may not always do so by killing him.' 49 Deadly force is reasonable, the Court held in Tennessee v Garner, 'where the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others.'50
By framing the reasonableness of a use of force with reference to probable cause, the Court introduced a mental-state requirement of sorts.
'Probable cause' is a notoriously elusive concept, but it is always described
with reference to belief - albeit a projected, hypothesized belief.5' 'The

45

46
47

48
49
50

51

mental state matters - who or what counts as 'the state' - varies from one amendment
to the other and even within the doctrinal rules for each amendment.
See e.g. Whren v United States, 517 US 806 (1996) [VWhren]; UnitedStates v Mendenhall, 446
US 544 at 554, n 6 (1980) [Mendenhall] stating that an officer's subjective intent to
detain individual is relevant to the question of whether 'seizure' occurred only
insofar as that intent was conveyed to the individual.
US Const amend IV.
Graham v Connor 490 US 386 at 395 (1989) [Graham]: '[AII claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analysed
under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard' [emphasis in
original].
Tennessee v Garner 471 US 1 at 8 (1985) [Garner].
Ibid at 9.
Ibid at 11. Garnercould be read (and was, by some lower courts) to impose a somewhat
more detailed three factor test to evaluate the constitutionality of a use of deadly force:
deadly force is permissible when (1) the officer has probable cause to believe the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, (2) the use of deadly force is
necessary to prevent escape, and (3) the officer has warned the suspect, if feasible;
see ibid at 11-2. But the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Garner, supra
note 48, in Scott v Harris,550 US 372 (2007) [Harris]. The majority opinion in Scott
did not mention 'probable cause' at all, relying instead on a general reasonableness*
inquiry.
The term 'probable cause' appears in the Fourth Amendment, though not in the
(un)reasonable searches and seizures clause. The warrant clause provides that 'no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause'; US Const amend IV. It is not clear,
however, that the phrase had any precise or consistent meaning at the time the
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substance of all ... definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for
52
belief' in some legally relevant fact. For Gamrds use of force standard, what

matters is whether the circumstances provided sufficient reason to believe
that the suspect posed a serious threat. To be sure, probable cause refers
to a hypothesized mental state rather than an actual one; the question is
what a reasonable officer could have believed, not what the particular
officer involved actually did believe. 53 In this sense, probable cause is an
objective standard, as courts often emphasize. It does not depend on the
actual subjective mental state of a particular police officer.
Notwithstanding the Court's insistence that the reasonableness standard does not turn on actual officers' actual motivations, it is still
useful to think of the inquiry as a variant of a mental-state requirement.
This is so because reasonableness is a question of belief and perspective;
that is, beliefs formed from the perspective of a hypothetical officer in the
shoes of the actual officer.5 4 Reasonableness is not assessed with the
benefit of knowledge that was unavailable to the officer at the time he
or she decided to use force; it is not assessed 'with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.'55 If a reasonable officer would not have known that an apparently uncooperative suspect was in fact suffering diabetic shock, then the
suspect's actual medical condition should not be considered when assessing the reasonableness of the use of force against him. Put differently,
objective reasonableness is not omniscience.
Sovereign mens rea determines not only the constitutionality of the
manner of a seizure but also the constitutionality of the fact that the
seizure takes place at all. First, the sovereign's mental state has some relevance 'for the threshold question whether a seizure has occurred: a
Fourth Amendment was adopted or that it has any such meaning today. See Albert W
Alschuler, 'Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment' (1984) 45 U Pitt L Rev 227
at 253-4, tracing historical meaning of 'probable cause' and noting fluidity of the
concept in modern doctrine.
52 Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160 at 175 (1949) [internal quotations and citation
omitted].

53 'An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.' Graham, supra note 47 at 397;
see also Scott v United States, 436 US 128 at 136 (1978) [Scott]: '[T]he fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'
54 Ornelas v United States, 517 US 690 at'696 (1996): 'The principal components of a
determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which
occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause.'
55 Scott, supra note 53 at 136.
56 See Graham,supra note 47 at 389.
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seizure occurs only 'when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.' 7 In other
words, the government cannot seize an individual through accidental
or negligent conduct. 58 An auto accident caused by an officer's reckless
driving in a high-speed chase is not a seizure, for the accident victim is
59
not stopped 'through means intentionally applied.'
Once government action has been classified as a seizure, the constitutionality of the action is again a matter of probable cause, defined in
terms of objective reasonableness. If an officer is aware of facts and circumstances that would give a reasonable officer probable cause to
believe an individual has committed a crime, the officer may seize that
individual.6 Again, it does not matter what the actual arresting officer's
actual motivations were. A custodial arrest may be, in fact, 'merely gratuitous humiliation imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising
extremely poor judgment.' 61 If a hypothetical reasonable officer exercising better judgment could have found probable cause, the arrest is
valid. Similarly, a traffic stop that is in fact motivated by racialized judgments is nonetheless constitutional so long as a hypothetical reasonable
officer could have found probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
had occurred.

62

57 Brower v County of Inyo, 489 US 593 at 597 (1989) [emphasis in original].
58 Ibid: '[I] f a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and pins a passerby against
a wall, it is likely that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.'
59 County of Sacramentov Lewis, 523 US 833 at 843-5 (1998). A seizure requires some actual
restraint of liberty. That is easy enough to establish when the individual is handcuffed
and taken into police custody, or shot, or otherwise physically restrained. When an
individual claims to have been seized through an explicit or implicit threat of force
instead of the application of immediate physical restraint, the analysis turns from the
sovereign's mental state to the mental state of a hypothetical reasonable suspect, the
question is whether 'in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' INS v Delgado,
466 US 210 at 215 (1984), quoting Mendenhall, supra note 45 at 554 (StewartJ). In
these cases where the government officer has not applied direct physical restraint,
the officer's intent to terminate freedom is relevant only insofar as it has been
communicated to the suspect; see Mendenhall supra note 45 at 554, n 6 (Stewart J).
60 See Atwater v City of Lago Vista, 532 US 318 at 354 (2001) [Atwater]. Atwater sustained a
custodial arrest for a misdemeanour offence committed in the arresting officer's
presence. The majority opinion left open the possibility that probable cause would
not justify a custodial arrest for a misdemeanour offence that occurred outside of
the officer's presence. For felony offences, probable cause justifies a custodial arrest
whether or not the offence occurred in the officer's presence. In addition, if a
seizure is less than a full custodial arrest, just a brief 'Terry stop,' the officer need
only have a 'reasonable suspicion' that 'criminal activity may be afoot'; Terry v Ohio,
392 US 1 at 30 (1968).
61 Atwater ibid at 346-7.
62 Whren, supra note 45.
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One might think of the difference between objective reasonableness,
which matters greatly to Fourth Amendment inquiries, and officers' subjective intentions, which generally do not matter, in terms of Hobbes's
distinction between artificial and natural persons. Objective reasonableness is a mens rea standard for an artificial person. Permissible uses of
force are defined with reference to the beliefs of a perfect agent, an
actor who represents the state with no slippage. A particular officer's subjective intentions - dislike of the suspect, or pleasure in cruelty - are
characteristics of the individual officer as a natural person, and they
are irrelevant to the question of constitutionality. We could say that objective reasonableness posits an agent of the state who acts with the epistemic limitations of a natural human being but without the emotions or
passions.63

ii The Eighth Amendment
Police officers are not, of course, the only state officials who may use physical force against individuals. When force is exercised after an individual
has been convicted and sentenced, it is usually classified not as a 'seizure'
but as 'punishment,' and it is the Eighth Amendment rather than the
Fourth that ostensibly defines what is permissible.' But like the Fourth
Amendment, the Eighth Amendment could be understood as a kind of
substantive criminal law for the state. In this area of constitutional law,
even more obviously than in Fourth Amendment doctrine, the constitutionality of uses of force often depends on an inquiry into the sovereign's
mental state. I have analysed the relevance of state intentions to Eighth
Amendment doctrine in detail elsewhere and offer only a brief
65
summary here.
63 Some commentators have questioned whether 'objective reasonableness' is really
possible, whether it is possible to identify a universal standard of rationality. See
Dana Raidgroski, 'Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the
Fourth Amendment' (2008) 17 Tex J Women & L 153 at 166: '[T]he particular
criteria [of reasonableness], the overarching concept of reasonableness and the
concept of common sense are suspect from a feminist perspective because of their
claims to objectivity and universal point of viewlessness ... [T]hey embody the
particular and privileged perspective of affluent white men.' Here, I make only a
narrower descriptive claim that the structure of the Fourth Amendment doctrine
evaluates government conduct with reference to a kind of mental-state requirement.
64 See Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651 at 671, n 40 (1977): '[T]he state does not acquire
the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it
has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
Where the state seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the
pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
65 Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra note 44.
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First, as in the seizure context, the sovereign's intentions may determine the threshold issue of whether 'punishment' has been imposed.
This threshold issue rarely arises for Eighth Amendment claims
because most federal courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment
to apply only after an individual has been convicted and sentenced. 66 A
criminal conviction is easy to establish, and there is rarely doubt about
whether individuals raising Eighth Amendment claims are being 'punished.' 67 Instead, the analysis is usually focused on the question whether
the instant punishment was cruel and unusual.
For that issue - not the fact of punishment, but its cruelty and unusualness - the sovereign's intent is again important. The precise way in
which sovereign intent matters varies with context, as does the determination of who or what counts as the sovereign. If an individual argues
that her sentence is cruel or unusual because it is disproportionately
severe, the court may examine the state's 'penological purposes' and
ask whether the punishment is excessive in light of those purposes.
Usually, penological purpose is a question of legislative intent." If, in contrast, an individual challenges not her overall sentence but some discrete
event or circumstance within prison, the relevant mental state is that of
the prison officials. In this context, constitutional law is perhaps most
explicitly analogous to 'substantive criminal law for the state.' Eighth
Amendment claims by prisoners are said to have an 'objective component' and a 'subjective component'; one could think of these two components as analogous to actus reus and mens rea in the substantive criminal
law. The objective component is simply a 'sufficiently serious' deprivation
within prison.-9 The subjective component, or mens rea, of a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim depends on the nature of the claimed violation. Challenges to conditions of confinement require the prisoner to
show that prison officials acted with 'deliberate indifference' to known
deprivations, and claims that a prison official used excessive physical
force require the prisoner to show that the official acted with malicious
66 See Graham, supra note 47 at 392 n 6 (1989). The threshold question whether
punishment has occurred does arise with respect to other constitutional provisions
that purport to regulate punishment, such as the 'double jeopardy' clause or the 'ex
post facto' clause. In those contexts, the analysis does focus on the state's 'punitive
intent.' See Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra note 44 at 1370-4.
67 In a number of separate opinions, Justice Thomas has argued that prisoners' Eighth
Amendment claims should first address the threshold question of whether their
claimed deprivation constitutes 'punishment' at all; see e.g. Farmer v Brennan, 511
US 825 at 859 (1994) (Thomas J, concurring) [Farmer]; Helling v McKinney, 509 US
25 at 40 (1993) (Thomas J, dissenting) [Helling]; Hudson v McMillian, 503 US 1 -at 28
(Thomas J, dissenting) [McMillian].
68 See e.g., Ewing v California,538 US 11 (2003); see Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra
note 44 at 1375-9.
69 See Wilson v Seiter, 501 US 294 at 298 (1991).
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and sadistic intent.7° In defining and justifying the 'deliberate indifference' standard, the Supreme Court referred explicitly to mens tea standards from the substantive criminal law. 7' And the words 'malicious and
sadistic,' on their face, invoke mens rea categories familiar from substantive criminal law.
Notably, in the prison context the relevant mental state is the mental
state of the actual, human prison official involved. It matters what the
natural person was thinking. It is still appropriate, in my view, to think
of the inquiry as one into sovereign mens rea, but now the mental state
of the natural person is imputed to the artificial person of the state.
(Were it otherwise, we might ask why malicious violence by an individual
state employee is classified as state punishment at all. Indeed, Justice
Thomas does ask this question and, finding no satisfactory answer, concludes that at least some acts of violence by prison officials are beyond
the purview of the Eighth Amendment. 72)

B INTERPRETIVE CONSTRUCTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

So far, the main argument of this part of the present article has been the
analytical claim that Fourth and Eighth Amendment doctrines reveal
assumptions of a personified state. Specifically, these doctrines are structured around what might be called sovereign mens rea inquiries: the permissibility of various actions by the state turns on what the state, or its
designated agent, or a hypothetical reasonable state official believed or
intended. Before turning to another dimension of constitutional anthropomorphism - constitutional remedies as punishment for the state - a
brief note on the import of sovereign mens rea inquiries is in order.
Determining mental states requires a kind of mind-reading, and it is
difficult enough when a court or fact-finder is guessing at the thoughts
of a single individual. As one scholar has recently noted, the widespread
assumption that jurors or judges 'can accurately determine ... mental
state[s] through common-sense generalizations' is undermined by
research in cognitive psychology. 73 In reality, mental-state inquiries are

occasions for 'interpretive construction': the fact-finder sorts and evaluates information in a non-rational process that is often shaped by the
70 See Farmer, supra note 67; McMillian, supra note 67 at 6-7; Milson v Seite, 501 US 294 at
301-5 (1991); see also Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra note 44 at 1380-4.
71 Farme, ibid at 836-7.

72 See e.g., Helling,supra note 67 at 40 (1998) (ThomasJ, dissenting): 'J]udges orjuries but not jailers - impose punishment.'
73 *Kevin Jon Heller, 'The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Red (2009) 99 J Crim L &

Criminology 317 at 321; see also Deborah Denno, 'Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian
World' (2005) 2005 U Ill L Rev 601 at 605, noting, of mental states, '[blow odd for
a legal system to base so much on something about which it seems to know so little.'
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fact-finder's own values, beliefs, and experiences.7 4 Put more simply, assessing someone else's mental state is never an 'objective' enterprise.
The opportunities for interpretive construction are no less, and may
be much greater, when we assess the 'mental state' of a complex entity
rather than that of an individual person. There are, of course, disputes
over whether groups and organizations can be said to have intentions,
knowledge, or other mental states at all. 75 But even the defenders of collective or institutional intent characterize it as a 'construct.' Intentions
7
must be attributed to the collective entity by some interpreting observer. 1
Consequently, sovereign mens rea standards are points of great flexibility
in constitutional law.
Many commentators have observed and evaluated the role of motive
analysis in other areas of constitutional law, especially the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 77 They have offered a variety of justifications
for such analysis, such as the claim that constructions of state intent
serve as good proxies for desired or undesired effects of state action, or
an argument that some governmental motives are intrinsically harmful,
or the claim that motive analysis helps guarantee a neutral and fair political process.7 8 I have argued elsewhere that the normative justifications
of motive analysis in First and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine are
somewhat less applicable to constitutional provisions purporting to regulate the use of force.79 But there may be a much more pragmatic

74 Mark Kelman, 'Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law' (1981) 33
Stan L Rev 591 at 592-3. Kelman discusses another type of interpretive
construction, 'time-framing,' that also turns out to be quite important to Fourth
Amendment analysis; see ibid at 600-16. Several of the limitations on the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule depend on the adoption of a narrow time frame
through which to view the constitutional violation. See e.g. United States v Leon, 468
US 897 at 906 (1984): '[T]he use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works
no new Fourth Amendment wrong. The wrong condemned by the [Fourth]
Amendment is fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself' [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted].
75 See e.g. Michael Keeley, 'Organizations as Non-Persons' (1981) 15 Journal of Value
Inquiry 149; William S Laufer & Alan Strudler, 'Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and
Variants of Vicarious Liability' (2000) 37 Am Crim L Rev 1285; William Laufer,
'Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds' (1994) 43 Emory LJ 647; Kenneth A Shepsle,
'Congress Is a 'They,' Not an It: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron' (1992) 12 Int'l
Rev L & Econ 239.
-76 See Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra note 44 at 1366, n 60.
77 See e.g. Lawrence A Alexander, 'Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality' (1978)
15 San Diego L Rev 925; Paul Brest, 'Palmer v Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive' 1971 Sup Ct Rev 95; Sheila Foster, 'Intent and
Incoherence' (1998) 72 Tul L Rev 1065.
78 These arguments are described in more detail in Ristroph, 'State Intentions,' supra
note 44 at 1385-91.
79 Ibid at 1394-404.
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explanation for the focus on governmental motive. Motive tests, or what
I've called here sovereign mens tea requirements, allow courts to dispose
of a great many constitutional challenges that would survive if we
focused only on the effects of government action. Without motive analysis, perhaps we would find more constitutional litigation and more successful challenges to state action than our society is willing to accept. It
is possible that constructions of the state's motivations or. intentions
serve as a necessary fiction, a way to accommodate the fact that we
cannot or will not deliver on the stated guarantees of the Constitution.
But whether we could or should abandon the practice of attributing
intentions to the state, we should recognize the interpretive opportunities
inherent in that practice.
iii Conceptualizingconstitutional violations: Who to 'punish'?
There is a second sense in which the constitutional regulation of uses of
force assumes an anthropomorphic state. For many (not all) Fourth and
Eighth Amendment violations, the availability of remedies turns on judgments about the need to penalize the state, and more specifically, the
need to deter future violations. This part explores the conceptions of
the state that underlie discussions and doctrines of constitutional remedies. When we think of remedies as penalties, I argue, we practice a
second type of anthropomorphism: we assume the state to be an entity
that responds to disincentives in ways similar to the responses of
natural persons to punishment. It is important to emphasize, though,
that there is no clear or uniform conception of the state that underlies
the law of constitutional remedies. Even if we think the state must be
penalized, we are not always sure who or what to punish. We are not
sure how to conceptualize constitutional violations; nor do we always
know which person or persons, natural or artificial, to hold responsible.
The sovereign proves elusive.
Before delving into the specific 'remedies available for unconstitutional
uses of force, a few general observations on the right-remedy relationship
are in order. 0 First, and most broadly, a concern to find effective constitutional remedies is consonant with the Hobbesian claim that served as
80 Scholarly scrutiny of constitutional remedies, of the challenges of implementation and
the phenomenon of under-enforcement, spans many areas of constitutional doctrine.
See e.g. Fallon, 'Manageable Standards,' supra note 42. But constitutional criminal
procedure appears to be a particularly rich terrain for these inquiries for a few
reasons. Both Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrine are largely shaped by remedies
alleged to be independent of the underlying constitutional right - the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and the Miranda exclusionary rule under the Fifth
Amendment. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are also probably among the most
litigated constitutional provisions and so are the provisions for which remedies are
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this article's point of departure: 'Covenants, without the sword, are but
words.' 81 Indeed, one of the Supreme Court's most famous decisions on
constitutional remedies, Mapp v Ohio, which extended the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to the states, offers a similarly dismissive
view of the value of laws that lack sanctions: the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence was held to be 'a constitutionally required - even ifjudicially implied -

deterrent safeguard without ...

which the Fourth

Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of words."'8" The
worry that rights without remedies will be 'mere words' appears often
83
in other contexts as well.

And yet, even if rights without remedies are 'but words,' enthusiasm
for constitutional remedies is hardly uniform. I suggested earlier that constitutional motive aialysis may serve to whittle away legal challenges that,
though potentially meritorious, are thought to put too much pressure on
the government. That view implies that our legal and political system
simply lacks the capacity to perform the full measure of the
Constitution's promises. A similar resignation (or pragmatism, perhaps)
seems to underlie the claim that 'a right-remedy gap is probably inevitable in constitutional law.'4 On this view, it is one thing to interpret the
Constitution and another to implement it. 5 Implementation is the art
of the possible, an enterprise in which the promise of remedies is only
,a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained.'8 6
A slightly different but still deeply pragmatic account closes the rightremedy gap by levelling down to the available remedies: insisting that

81
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demanded most often, and they may protect rights that many courts (and other
observers) have little desire to remedy.
Hobbes, supra note 4 at 117.
Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 at 648 (1961), quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States,
251 US 385 (1920).
Chief Justice Marshall famously proclaimed that although the US government had
been 'termed a government of laws, and not of men,' it would 'cease to deserve this
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right': Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 at 163 (1803). See also Bivens v Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 at 399 (1971) [Bivens] (Harlan
J, concurring), noting and eventually endorsing the view that federal courts have
power to devise remedies for violations of constitutional rights 'when the absence of
alternative remedies *renders the constitutional command a mere form of words'
[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; c.f Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1960) at 83, stating that '[a]bsence of
remedy is absence of right.'
John CJeffries,Jr, 'The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law' (1999) 109Yale LJ 87
at 87.

85 See Richard H Fallon, Jr, Implementing the Constititution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 2001) at 37-42.
86 Richard H Fallon, Jr, & Daniel J Meltzer, 'New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies' (1991) 104 Harv L Rev 1731 at 1778.
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constitutional rights exist only so far as they can be and are remediated.
Under Daryl Levinson's 'remedial equilibration' model, '[r]ights are
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world,
but for their scope, shape, and very existence. ' 87 To know the parameters
of a constitutional right, look to the remedy. The right just is what the
courts (or other branches of government) will enforce.
Contra Levinson's more extreme positivist claims, normative and preremedial conceptions of rights surely do and must shape constitutional
analysis in important ways. 8 But I share Levinson's view that looking at
the back end of constitutional law, at its practical consequences, can
tell us much about its conceptual underpinnings. In this remainder of
this part, I examine remedies in search of a slightly different pay off: I
want to see if remedies can reveal not what rights are but what constitutional violations are. After all, nobody brings a constitutional complaint
when she believes all her rights are being respected. So the critical question may be what counts as a violation rather than what is the nature of
the right. And it turns out that how we understand a constitutional violation is bound up with how we understand the violator - the state or sovereign that is the target of constitutional law.
On this question of violations and violators, consider the structure of
modern constitutions. With some isolated exceptions, including the
Preamble to the US Constitution, these documents are not written in
the voice of contracting subjects. 9 Instead, they are phrased as descriptive
statements of government powers and individual rights or as prohibitions
of certain conduct: 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated'-; or
'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

87 See Daryl J Levinson, 'Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration' (1999) 99
Colum L Rev 857 at 858. See also ibid at 880: 'The only way to see the constitutional
right ... is to look at remedies.'
88 At times, Levinson's impatience with 'rights essentialism' leads him to a wholesale
dismissal of normative theory. See e.g. ibid at 924-5, theorizing that a 'true
constitutional conception' of a right, one independent of what courts have
protected, is 'both pointless and indeterminate,' But none of us - not courts, not
Levinson, not the constitutional pragmatists whose work he endorses - can escape
normativity. Even when courts make 'pragmatic' remedial judgments, they rely on
some independent conception of the right in question in order to evaluate the
available options. Levinson sometimes acknowledges this; indeed, the very phrase
'remedial equilibration' sometimes invokes a dynamic relationship between empirical
constraints and theoretical ideals. See e.g. ibid at 927: '[T]he enterprise of
constitutional law ... is as much about public policy as it is about political theory,
moral philosophy, or backward-looking interpretation of text or history.'
89 'We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union ... do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'
90 US Const amend IV.
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cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' 9' Like almost all of the US Bill
of Rights, these provisions are written in the passive voice. Without a
specified actor as their subject, it is unclear exactly who or what might
violate these provisions. And, of course, the provisions themselves tell
us nothing about what should happen if the right of the people to be
92
secure is violated or if cruel and unusual punishments are inflicted.
This linguistic structure yields (at least) two very different ways of conceptualizing a constitutional violation. On one view, the constitution
describes the parameters of sovereign power, and acts beyond those parameters are not properly attributed to the sovereign at all. This view is the
inverse of Richard Nixon's famous claim that if the president does it, it's
not illegal. On this view of constitutional violation, if an act is unconstitutional, it is not really the act of the true sovereign. The artificial person of
the sovereign exists only insofar as he (or it) complies with the constitution. When a putative sovereign or its putative agent conducts an unreasonable seizure or imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, that actor is
revealed as an impostor." So we might call this concept of constitutional
violation 'the impostor theory.'
On the second view, duly authorized sovereigns can and do violate the
constitution. Constitutional law should strive to discourage such violations, and it should devise appropriate remedies when violations do
occur. But constitutional violations are acts of the state; in fact, only acts
of the state can violate the constitution. On this conceptualization, the
rules and procedures that establish a sovereign (or particular government
institutions, such as Congress or the president) are independent of the
rules that restrict the conduct of the sovereign. Call this 'the sovereign
misconduct theory': it recognizes that a true sovereign may nonetheless
violate core constitutional restrictions.
It is a scholarly indulgence to invent new labels for old ideas, and previous scholarship may have captured the distinctions I am drawing here.
Matthew Adler and Michael Dorf have argued that the Constitution sets
91 US Const amend VIII.
92 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, contains ostensibly similar
substantive provisions but also includes an enforcement provision. See ibid s 8:
'Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure'; ibid s
12: 'Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment'; ibid s 24(1): 'Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by
this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances'; and ibid s 24(2) (exclusionary rule).
93 A similar argument was made and rejected in Monme v Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) at 172,
which held that 'state action' includes the acts of 'those who carry a badge of authority
of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their
authority or misuse it.'
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forth 'existence conditions': it describes the conditions under which a law
exists qua law or under which an authoritative government entity exists as
authority.94 Unlike application conditions (rules by which to evaluate acts
of the duly constituted government), existence conditions tell us whether
the government is duly constituted at all or whether an act counts as official government actionf 5 Though I take the liberty of using my own
labels, 96 it could be that the impostor theory corresponds to the view
that all constitutional provisions set forth existence conditions. 97 An individual or organization who violates the constitution is not a true sovereign
or legitimate agent of the state but an impostor. If, on the other hand, we
think that the Bill of Rights sets forth only application conditions, then
violations of the Bill of Rights are better characterized as sovereign misconduct. A duly authorized sovereign has misbehaved, but he or it is
98

no less a true sovereign.

At different times and in different contexts, US constitutional law has
relied on each of these conceptions of a constitutional violation. The
sovereign misconduct theory seems to be the official and more frequently
visible approach. Indeed, state-action doctrine in the United States seems
to insist that it is always and only the state (or its authorized agents) that
can violate the Constitution. If a private individual breaks into my home
without authorization to search for evidence of a crime, he has probably
violated burglary and trespass laws, but he has not violated the Fourth

94 Matthew D Adler & Michael C Dorf, 'Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review' (2003) 89 Va L Rev 1105 at 1119 [Adler & Dorf], defining the constitutional
existence condition with reference to criteria for legal validity; see also ibid at 1110,
using the concept to identify legitimate government actors.
95 Ibid at 1119-20.
96 Adler & Dorf themselves may have invented a new label for an old concept; see ibid at
1109, n 13, explaining that the jurisprudential term 'legal validity' is equivalent to their
'existence condition.'
97 Adler & Dorf do argue, ibid at 1112, that 'all constitutional provisions might be
understood as setting forth existence conditions.' They also use the term 'impostor'
in several instances, explaining that constitutional criteria enable us to distinguish
legitimate government institutions and true state officials from impostors; ibid at
1110. See also ibid at 1127, 1141, 1200.
98 To put the point a third way, we might proceed from Abner Greene's observation that
the Constitution both enables and disables government agents; Abner S Greene, 'Can
We Be Legal Positivists without Being Constitutional Positivists?' (2005) 73 Fordham L
Rev 1401 at 1403. The difference between the impostor theory and the sovereign
misconduct theory may turn on whether we think this enabling and disabling
happen in only one step or in separate steps. If the Constitution disables by enabling
only so much, if enabling and disabling happen all at once, then an entity that
violates the Constitution is an impostor. If, however, the Constitution enables
government agents and then, in indlependent provisions, disables them, an agent
who violates a disabling provision is nonetheless a legitimate government actor: this
is the sovereign misconduct theory.
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Amendment. In contrast, when a police officer breaks into my home
without a warrant and without probable cause, he has violated the
Fourth Amendment. On this account, the police officer remains the
sovereign's agent, a state actor, even as he violates the Constitution.
But how well does he represent the state? Suppose the police officer
does not break into the suspect's home but instead breaks the suspect's
leg intentionally and gratuitously. Police violence can constitute state
action in the sense that the Fourth Amendment will apply, but the
remedy available for an excessive force violation is premised on the
notion that the individual officer, as natural person, is personally liable
for the harm.- It turns out that different conceptions of a constitutional
violation and different conceptions of the violator underlie different constitutional remedies.
In many instances, the available constitutional remedy is simply invalidation of the unconstitutional government action. If a court finds an act
of legislation to violate the Fourth or Eighth Amendment (or some other
constitutional provision), the court pronounces the statute invalid and
directs other government officials not to apply it.""' Nullification is a
potential remedy for other types of government action; a court may
reverse a conviction or order a prisoner set free if it finds she is being
held in violation of the Constitution.' °0 In most cases, nullification of government action seems to presume sovereign misconduct rather than an
act of an impostor because the remedy does not question the legitimacy
of the government actor itself. When a death penalty sentence is invalidated under the Eighth Amendment, the claim is not that the legislature
who passed the authorizing statute or the trial court that imposed the sentence is an impostor. The focus is on the action, not the actor, and the
remedy is to end or nullify the unconstitutional act.
Some challenges to state violence, such as an Eighth Amendment challenge to a statute or an individual defendant's sentence, may permit nullification or invalidation as a remedy.02 More often, though, claims of an
unconstitutional use of force arise in suits for money damages. And for
monetary remedies, the underlying theory of constitutional violation
seems closer to the impostor theory. This is so thanks to the notably
Hobbesian concept of sovereign immunity. To get around the sovereign's
99 See text accompanying note 104 infra.
100 See e.g. Berger v New York, 388 US 41 (1967), invalidating state law authorizing
eavesdropping without probable cause.
101 'The basic and essential remedy of constitutional rights is defensive assertion against
government action'; John C Jeffries, Jr, 'Structural Reform Revisited' (2007) 95 Cal L
Rev 1387 at 1391, citing Henry M Hart, Jr, 'The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic'(1953) 66 Harv L Rev

1362 at 1373.
102 E.g. Kennedy v Louisiana, 554 US 407 (2008); Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977).
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prerogative to decline to be sued, the law of monetary damages for constitutional violations imagines the individual government official as an
impostor who has usurped the cloak of public authority and thus is personally liable for the violation.
Under American law, both the federal government and state governments enjoy sovereign immunity. °3 Derived from English common law,
sovereign immunity is premised on claims that evoke Hobbes's assertion
that the sovereign could not be subject to civil law. In Blackstone's terms,
'the king himself can do no wrong." 4 Whatever its conceptual justification (or normative merit), the doctrine of sovereign immunity would
seem to rule out damage actions as means" of enforcing constitutional
provisions.10 Justice Scalia has called sovereign immunity 'a monument
to the principle that some constitutional claims can go unheard.' 1 6
But in some instances, American law has found a way around the
obstacle. Illustrating, perhaps, the fact that sovereignty is plural rather
than unified, shortly after the civil war, Congress enacted a federal
statute permitting lawsuits against government officials who violate the
federal constitution. Under this statute, '[elvery person who, under
color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.' 107 As interpreted by US courts, this
103 See e.g. McMahon v United States, 342 US 25 (1951) (federal); Alden v Maine, 527 US
706 (1999) (state). Either the federal or a state government may waive its immunity
and permit itself to be sued, but it is immune until such waiver.
104 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in FourBooks (Philadelphia: JB
Lippincott, 1893), bk I at *244. See also Samuel Pufendorf, Dejure Naturae et Gentium,
translated by CH Oldfather and William Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1934), vol
2 at 1342-3: '[If a king] has discovered any fault in a pact of his making, he can of his
own authority serve notice upon the other party that he refuses to be obligated by the
reason of that fault; nor does he have to secure of the other a release from a thing
which, of its own nature, is incapable of producing an obligation or ight.'
105 Both federal sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity have many critics. See
e.g. United States v Lee, 106 US 196 at 208-9 (1882): 'Under our system the people... are
the sovereign ... [T]here is no reason why deference to any person, natural or
artificial, not even the United States, should prevent [a citizen] from using the
measure which the law gives him for the protection and enforcement of [his]
right'); Vicki C Jackson, 'Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and
Judicial Independence' (2003) 35 Geo Wash Int'l L Rev 521; Vicki C Jackson,
'Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity' (2000) 75 Notre Dame L Rev 953.
106 Webster v Doe, 486 US 592 at 613 (1988) (ScaliaJ, dissenting).
107 42 USC § 1983 provides a cause of action against state officials who violate
constitutional rights: 'Every person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
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statute holds government officials accountable as private individuals - or
in more Hobbesian terms, as natural persons rather than artificial ones.
Here, we see traces of the impostor theory of constitutional violation.
One way to explain § 1983 is to say that a government agent who violates
the constitution acts 'under color of law,' but not with genuine legal authority. When such an agent steps beyond constitutional bounds, he cannot
be understood as the artificial person of the sovereign for purposes of
immunity; he is, instead, a natural person usurping the mantle of
public authority. To be sure, qualified immunity and indemnification
make identifying the true target of the penalty still more complicated,
which is why one can say at most that 1983 doctrine reveals traces of an
impostor theory.'For the moment, I want to contrast nullification or invalidation as a
constitutional remedy with the monetary remedies that are more often
pursued for 'excessive force' violations under the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments. Nullification remedies involve a pronouncement that the
sovereign has exceeded its power. At the same time, they are forwardlooking, in that they put a stop to an otherwise continuing violation.
But they do not attempt to 'punish' a misbehaving ruler. Damages, in
contrast, seem to at least flirt with the notion that it was not the true sovereign but an impostor who violated the Constitution.' 9 And as remedies,
they look back to the past, to a violation that has already taken place.
Most importantly, monetary remedies, along with the exclusionary rule
as presently understood, are portrayed as penalties, intended to deter
future violations.
The availability of these constitutional remedies suggests that Hobbes
was wrong, in some respects, or at least that his claim about the impossibility of subjecting the sovereign to law is inapplicable to a system of
divided sovereignty. We have identified, in theory, ways to enforce judgments that the sovereign has violated the foundational covenant. In
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.' A similar cause of action against federal
officials, for certain constitutional violations, is available under Bivens, supra note 83.
Federal law also provides a criminal equivalent to § 1983; see 18 USC § 242.
108 In practice, many government agencies indemnify their employees, taking
responsibility both to defend § 1983 suits and to pay hny damage award. In addition,
the doctrine of qualified immunity operates as a kind of safe harbour for the
natural persons who act as agents of the sovereign. Under this doctrine, a
government official is immune from suit under § 1983 unless his or her conduct
violated a 'clearly established' right. Given the indeterminacy or at least the underdeterminacy of constitutional law, courts find that few rights against the use of force
are sufficiently 'clearly established' to permit a § 1983 suit to proceed. See Rachel
Harmon, 'When Is Police Violence Justified?' (2008) 102 Nw UL Rev 1119 at 1140-3.
109 Criminal liability under 18 USC § 242 seems premised on this idea as well.

686

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

practice, however, imagining constitutional remedies as sanctions for a
true or pretended sovereign may be a self-defeating proposition.
There is a sense in which a sanction-based theory of constitutional
remedies pulls itself down by its own bootstraps. If we rationalize
Fourth and Eighth Amendment remedies as penalties designed to
deter a personified sovereign, then these remedies will seem inappropriate in circumstances where they do not deter. That is exactly what has
happened to the exclusionary rule: the Supreme Court has identified
numerous circumstances where excluding evidence is unlikely to deter
government misconduct and has held the exclusionary rule inapplicable
in those circumstances. ' 0 Similarly, monetary remedies for constitutional
violations have been criticized on the grounds that they do not effectively
deter the government, for the government does not respond to financial
disincentives in the same ways that private individuals do.'' Even the liability of individual government officers - natural persons - under § 1983
has been dramatically limited by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and
often, these limitations on liability are justified with reference to theories
of deterrence. Sometimes, the claim is that constitutional violations made
in good faith are not deterrab.le and so should not be penalized; someand
times, the claim is that a failure to provide immunity will over-deter
'2
make officials unwilling to perform their duties effectively.
It may well be the case that excluding illegally seized evidence or
imposing monetary liability on government officials fails to deter constitutional violations. But that fact, in itself, is no reason to abandon the
remedies. Perhaps the mistake was to think in terms of deterrence in
the first place. Deterrence theories may simply reflect undue anthropomorphism. Perhaps the state is not much like a person after all, and it
cannot be regulated according to the same legal models that we use
for private individuals.
That possibility suggests that there is much work to be done to improve
our understanding of the subject of constitutional law. Conceptualizing
the state as something other than a person - cutting off the head of
the king, in Foucault's memorable phrase - would require a dramatic
'
theoretical reorientation, and I do not undertake that project here." It
is a question that matters not just to those interested in criminal justice
110 E.g. Herring v United States, 555 US 135, 129 S Ct 695 (2009); Hudson, supra note 2;
United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984).
111 See DarylJ Levinson, 'Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs' (2000) 67 U Chi L Rev 345.

"112 See Alan K Chen, 'The Facts about Qualified Immunity' (2006) 55 Emory LJ 229 at
233-42.
113 For an attempt to give a non-personified account of the contemporary state, see
Edward L Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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and regulations of the state's use of force, but to those interested in the
possibility of constitutional law more generally. My aim here has been the
more modest effort to identify the ways in which anthropomorphic conceptions of the state shape the constitutional law of violence. In keeping
with that aim, I want to close with some final reflections specific to the
subject of violence.
Conclusion: Violence and the rule of reason
Mechanisms of enforcement, remember, are only one of the challenges
facing constitutional regulation of the use of force. A second challenge
is one of interpretive authority: who (or what institution) will interpret
the covenant and determine when it has been violated. Part II of this
article mentioned this challenge but passed over it quickly, noting that
the institution of judicial review seems to answer the challenge of interpretive authority. Judges interpret the covenant or constitution; they
review claims of alleged violations and determine which of those claims
have merit.
When they do so, however, they rarely find that a state actor has used
force in violation of the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. Almost every
executive and legislative use of (domestic) force falls within the scope
of the Constitution as interpreted by the judiciary. One explanation of
this state of affairs is that actors within the executive or legislature internalize constitutional constraints and therefore exercise their discretion
within the independent limitations of the covenant. Constitutional violations are rarely found, on this account, because the Constitution is in fact
rarely violated. A second explanation, more pessimistic, is that courts tend
to interpret the Fourth and Eighth Amendments using the flexibility of
the 'sovereign mens rea' standards discussed in Part III or the (non-)deterrence rationales discussed in Part V to permit whatever actions executive
and legislative officials do in fact take.
In the end, I am not sure it matters which-of these explanations we
adopt. Under either account, the substantive regulation of the state's
use of force turns out to be a rule of reason: the state may use force as
much and as often as is reasonable. This is most obvious in the substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine, but it turns out to be true of Eighth
Amendment law as well. The Supreme Court has held (with respect to
the Fourth Amendment) that what constitutes reasonableness is 'not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application" '4; reasonableness analysis is, instead, a 'factbound morass' through which judges
must slosh."' And, as Part III argues, the reasonableness that legitimates
114 Graham,supra note 47 at 396.
115 Hais, supra note 50.
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state violence is often a projected reasonableness rather than an evaluation of the actual officer's actual reasons for using force. The Eighth
Amendment, in contrast, does not refer to reasonableness but instead
to 'cruel and unusual punishments.' But deference to legislative and
executive decisions render Eighth Amendment scrutiny something
quite close to rational basis review.11 6 And with respect to any Fourth or
Eighth Amendment claim raised in a suit for monetary damages under
§ 1983, the doctrine of qualified immunity further enshrines reasonableness as the standard by granting individual officials a 'reasonable mistake'
1 17
defence from liability.
The substantive rule that governs the state's use of force appears to be
a general rule of reason, but that is not all. In most cases, it is the legislature's or executive's self-assessment of its own 'reasonableness' that
carries the day. When courts encounter a challenge to a legislative orjudicial choice to use force, the characteristic response is one of deference.
With respect to police force, courts emphasize that they will not judge
a use of force with 'the 20/20 vision of hindsight."' Instead, '[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation."' 9 Analysis of other
Fourth Amendment claims, including challenges to an officer's choice
to make an arrest, is similarly characterized by deference to discretion of judicial deference to the police officer's on-the-ground discretionary
judgment. Judicial deference to the discretion of other branches is prevalent in Eighth Amendment doctrine as well. The United States Supreme
Court has suggested that deference to legislative judgments is the first
principle guiding Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.' 20 And
when the Court required prisoners to show 'malicious and sadistic'
intent to establish an Eighth Amendment violation by a prison official,
its rationale was one of deference to prison officials' discretionary
116 See e.g. Ewing v California, 538 US 11 at 28 (2003), sustaining a mandatory prison
sentence against an Eighth Amendment challenge, on the grounds that 'it is enough
that the state ... has a reasonable basis for believing that [the sentence] advances
the goals of its criminal justice system' [internal quotation marks omitted].
117 See e.g. Linda Ross Meyer, 'When Reasonable Minds Differ' (1996) 71 NYUL Rev 1467.
118 Graham, supra note 47 at 396.
1.19 Ibid at 396-7; see also McCullough v Antolini, 559 F (3d) 1201 at 1208 (11 Cir 2009),
emphasizing 'the deference we afford the split-second police judgments in the field';
Pace v City of Palmetto, 489 F Supp (2d) 1325 (MD Fla 2007) (need for a 'measure of
deference to police judgment').
120 See Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957 at 998 (1991) (KennedyJ, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) [Harmelin];see also Ewingv California,538 US 11 at 23-5
(2003) (plurality opinion), adopting the proportionality principles articulated in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin, ibid.

COVENANTS FOR THE swoRD

689

violence: with respect to uses of force, 'a deliberate indifference standard
does not ... convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight
decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and without the
luxury of a second chance.""1
Arguably, choices made 'in haste' and 'under pressure' or under
'tense and uncertain' circumstances are more, not less, deserving of ex
post review. But the Court implies that to subject such decisions to searching judicial scrutiny would produce a flood of litigation, some of which
would lead to successful judgments against the state. And that, apparently,
the Court will not countenance. It could be that a flood of litigation and
some successful judgments against the state is what it would mean to have
covenants for the sword. Hobbes did not think such a state of affairs was
consistent with a stable sovereign, and perhaps the Supreme Court
agrees.
In any case, there is probably more to the judicial reluctance to review
,use of force' decisions than a general concern about generating too
much constitutional litigation. In the judiciary's frequent declarations
of its own incompetence on questions of proportionality and appropriate
force, one finds a fairly direct suggestion that state violence is, in fact,
beyond law. Part of the problem seems to be this: the judiciary has no
clear methodology to decide what force is 'reasonable' or what punishment is 'proportionate'; that is, independent of the methodology deployed
by legislatures or by individual state agents. If anything, the individual
police and prison officers who directly exercise force have a more developed framework in which to assess the necessity of force. Aware of its own
limited methodological resources, the judiciary views deference as the
safest path.
Courts could address their methodological deficit by further developing Fourth and Eighth Amendment doctrines - by articulating more
122
specific factors that determine reasonableness or proportionality.
Instead, judicial opinions have actively resisted more precise legal standards for the use of force. It seems that judges do not want to get into
the business of regulating violence too closely.' 23 I suggested earlier that
we could think of the separate branches of a divided government as
plural quasi-sovereigns, but perhaps this depiction needs modification.
With respect to the use of the sword, which is arguably the quintessential
121 Whitley v Albers, 475 US 312 at 320 (1986).
122 For example, Harmon, supra note 105, suggests ways to do this in the Fourth
Amendment context.
123 Of course, as Robert Cover famously argued,judges inevitably do give orders that other
state officials exercise violence to enforce. But this is most directly true of trial judges;
appellate judges and especially the Justices of the US Supreme Court may more easily
imagine themselves distanced from the state's uses of violence; see Robert Cover,
'Violence and the Word' (1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601 at 1613-4.
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exercise of sovereign power, the judiciary makes no claim to sovereignty
and indeed explicitly eschews it. Here, one must think of the
Schmittean reading of Hobbes: sovereign is he who decides the exception, who makes discretionary judgments unbounded by rules. Schmitt
argues that ultimate questions about the use of violence are beyond
law. And while no US court would openly endorse this claim, the judicial
deference to executive and legislative choices suggests that, at the
moment, the use of force is in practice largely beyond the law.

